This suggests that if the insurgents were astute and ambitious, the area they contr.'! might be substni~ially extended.
INTRODUCTION
The nature and causes of dissidence pose messy, uncertain, and subtle problems for research.
The usual technical statistical problems --specification error, simultaneity, multicollinearity --must be overcome or tolerated; survey and interview data must be tested for bias arising from suspicion or fear; lack of a good. non-tautological theory leaves us with the need to go back always to first principles.
Beyond these procedural problems, there remains the substantive difficulty of choosing among reasonable alternative explanations for violent dissidence and, having chosen, of trantlating models into policy. The purpose of this study is to consider alternative explanations of dissidence in the Philippines, to bring to bear alternative pieces of evidence at different levels of aggregation, and to extract policy implications.
In this discussion we shall analyze several models of this rebellicn and examine data for municipios, barrios, and individuals.
II. THE MODERN CONTEXT OF PHILIPPINE REBELLION
The Philippines has a long history of dissident moveizents forming, bcrovming active, and then declining. Since 1900 the nation has V7natever the size of the organization, an important question in interpreting statistical models is whether the current one is truly the same organization as the Hukbalahap of 1949 Hukbalahap of -1953 and whether the latter was largely the same as the wartime guerrilla force. If it is, then statistical modols should be specified that appeal to historical continuity and the transmission of "tastes" for insurgency from generation 4 to generation.
If not, then current causes become more plausible.
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III. THE MITCHELL MODEL: AN APPEAL TO CONTINUITY
Mitchell fits a regression model to controlled municilplos with the following results:
5
(1) "Coercion," as represented by a "contiguity" factor is an important factor in determining conLrol.
(2) The presence of Pampangos, an ethnic and linguistic group, is a "crucial" condition for HMB success.
Control is greater where most men are farmers and most farmers are tenants.
The regression model is fitted using 1939 socio-economic dota for municipios.
Mitchell assumes that the current organization is the direct lineal descendant of the wartime Huks, the Huks who conducted the insurgency in 1949-1953. In fact his historical explanations make sense only on this assumption.
We can break our discussion of the Mitchell model into two parts:
problems of procedure, particulafly specification and measurement, and problems of substance and interpretation. Problems of measurement concern, in particular, the matrix of contiguity coefficients used to transform, or weight the raw L939 socio-economic data. The matrix is derived from map measurements, raising the question of the reproduci-7 bility of the results and their sensitivity to measurement error.
Mitchell writes his control equation
1IC. F(HCJ i; X.
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where HC is a variable measuring the degree of Huk control. H' Is defined as the fraction of barrios In a given municipality listed as "critical" by the Philippine Constabulary In 1967. Municipios in which some "critical" barrios are reported are .;hown in Fig. 1 . Vic criteria the constabulary uses to assign barrios to the "critical" category 8 are not given.
In any case thE fraction of barrios controlled does not necessarily represent the fraction of population I:ontrolled.
Obviously in a given municipality a large number of small population barrios could be controlled or conversely a few large barrios, giving measurement error in the actual amount of control. This suggests that the observations should be weighted by some mea.isure of importance.
The natural variable to choose as the weight *-
'e would be thc adult population (see below).
Introducing indirect effects of control in one inLinicipio on control in another and linearizing, we have in matrix notation
where HC is a JXI vector of observations on fluk control, A is the JXJ matrix of weights, X is a Jxn matri:.: of J observations .ia n exogenous variables, and e is a vector of random errors. Manipulating and solving for HC yields
Since the equations are not linear in the parameters, direct application. ,f odina,-y linear multipLe rcg'ession is not appropriate. . ..
a,-
Mitchell's estimation procedure duals nuatlý with two serious problems. The first is simultaneity: contro, in a given municiplo is parLly determined by the value of control in other municipios.
fhe value of control in other municipios, in turn, is partly determined by its value in this municipio. Eliminating HC from the right-hand side transforms the equation into a "reduced form" in which this simultaneity, which would bias the estimated coefficients, is eliminated. we were interested in the effects of measurement error on the results.
--8-- -9-We began by constructing the matrix A of contiguity coefficients by 10 measUring map distances using a graphic input device. 0The map dista ices were then transformed into percentages of common border --the a.. of matrix A. We then applied exactly the same procedure as had Mitchell, using his reported 1939 data. Figure _2 shows the relations between the contiguity parameter k an] R2 for our data and
Mitchell's. The figure also shows the results of introducing measurement error by adding a random number to each original distance from which the A matrix was derived. Specifically, random numbers within the bounds of + 20 percent of the original di.,ýtances were added to the non-zero borders.
Since the results were unchanged by this "FLrtial" randomization, we •aen tried a completely random set of distances, simply substituting a random number between 0 and 100 for every nonzero distance. Th, 6,lLs are only slightly sensitive to the extent of commen border, once the pattern 9f commonality is set.
The R2 in our curves does reach a maximum at .75 rather than this.
The reason for til oýl,,i!ftV of the coefficients 3!,cs in the specification of Lht i,,odcl. Consider the matrix:
(1 -kA)-I = I + kA + k2A2,...
A typical element of A is equal to about .3 or less, and k is less than -1 one.
The higher order terms in (I -ki%) vanish quickly. Th'ic impact of ronnegative coefficients in tie A matrix will always damp down. So no matter what distances we start wlth, actual or random, when the -1 actual data matrix X is nuLtiplied by (I -kA) there will be little difference in the transformed d;ita. We will always gtet approximately the same equation.
Consequently k kas on ly lim i t ed eca n ing as j meastire of cont igu i ty or coercion; it is not at all sensiLive to the !entths of shared boun- [Lawton's advwnce from Manila.] .. It is quite true that the Tagalogs were the prime movers in the insurroction against us, as they had been in all previous insurrections against Spain.
But tihe "Tagalog tribe" was no more alone among the Filipino people in their wishes and views than the "unterrified" Taimany tribe who inhabit the wilds of Manhattan 'Iand at the mouth of the Hudson River are alone in their views among our people. The point of our two examples is not that one Interpretation of history is correct or incorrect.
It is that for any given regression model one can find supporting historical evidence.
In particular, whenever historians attempt to infer popular tastes and opinions, the room for argument is immense.
These are surely not decisive criticisms of Mitchell's model. As we proceed, in fact, his emphasis on the importance of coercion will be re-confirmed with better data. But a puzzle remains: We know that there have been very large fluctuations in "control" over the short run.
There is no environmental factor or long-run socio-economic variable that corresponds to these fluctuations. This suggests that the dynamics of rebellion require models with more than such stable explanatory variables.
IV. AIJrtRNATIVE MODELS OF CONTROl. --ML.NICIPALITrES AND BARRIOS
In order to capture the dyn,amics of control, we feel it Is essenti;,J to examine the cL tual operations ol the Iluks in Central luzon. . The results of fitting these three models are shown in Table 3 .
In all cases, the observations have been weighted by the adult popula- Fig. 1.) Survey data must be interpreted cautiously, particularly when they come from areas where insurgents and the government are in conflict.
Responses to factual questions about the nature of HMB activitie.i corresponded closely to our other information on HMB activities by area.
The correspondence on these questions increases our confidence in the validity of the responses to the attitudinal questions. However, the proportion of non-responses to the HIDB questions was higher in Central Luzon than elsewhere, about half compared with one-third nationwide.
This could be consistent with the hypotheses either that people in Central Luzon are more afraid of the HMB or that they are reluctant to compromise the 10MB to interviewers who might be representatives of the government. "Medians based on weighted percentages. Text of question:
Here Is a ladder with 10 steps (SIZOV LAD)DER).
Let us say that the highest step (POINT) represents the best life you can imagine.
The lower the steps in the ladder (TRACE STEPS DOWNWARD) the worse the kind of life --so that the bottom step (POINT) represents the worst kind of life you can imagine. "HIMB" areas are municipios in whch some controlled barrios are 1 .sted by the Constabu;iry.
"Near 11MB" are other municipios in Central Luzon.
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Large amounts of detailed evidcreec it the s;ttiic rt, 1ad pf~t,, , of the link organization arc: hard t i, icqii ,-,'. In P'oJ' )it ot-y) tiii stalbularv we were able to gain ,i,, ,,.
ti, iitt'rvl ews witil 1. 1hi . All but one of the nine interviewees from Freddie's area, when asked about the training they had received, mentioned political indoctrination. Most of them held the same political views. Typical quotations from four of the subjects are given below.
I)'1 1
We have group meetings and in said meetings, we were lectured to by the commander. We were told that the Philippine Government is not bad, and it is only the administrators of said government that ought to be changed.
Change could be effected either by elections or violence if need be.
China and Russia were the only countries mentioned to us in lectures and in group talks by our leaders.
It is said that those two countries are the only ones that are now led by the true sLns of the motherland, that see to it that the people are served and not the people serving the officials of the government.
They said that the HMB movement aims to attain what had happened in those countries, China and Russia.
... the main enemies of the HMBs are, first: the local exploiters who suck the blood of the common tao so as to -27-enrich themselves; the people in the government who commit graft and corruption and all sorts of ainomalies just to entrench themselves in power; those people who serve as stool-pigeons for the above-mentioned personalities, and, secondly, those foreigners who drain our rich natural resources, export it to other countries and bring it back as finished products and sell it beyond the reach of the common people. Most of these aliens are the Americans.
They were what we called American imperialists.
They told us that they wanted to establish a New Democracy that will give justice to everybody, and that there will be no more poor and no more rich, but everybody will be equal.
"How?" By establishing a government that is really after the welfare of the working man, a government for the Filipinos not dictated by foreigners.
These statements resemble those in early Viet Cong documents.
Perhaps of soi-interest and unlike Vietnam is the lack of an attack on the government as an institution. Only the people in the institution are attacked.
As for the alleged ideological split between Sumulong, the chief of the HMB at that time, and Freddie and the other commanders, five subjects were aware of some split.34 Two others described Sumulong as loyal to the HMB's political motivation. The strongest criticism of Sumulong ran as follows:
I think the leaders of the HMB are in the organization in order to guide the movement of the HMB and their ardent desire is to champion the cause it is fighting for. I do not know any of the persons you mentioned [personally] . All I know is that the group of Commander Caviteno is out to get Commander Sumulong because this Sumulong has already turned traitor to the cause of the HMB.
The one interviewee from Sumulong's group --the Angeles-Clark faction --stated that Sumulong himself was a "die-hard Communist." However, this person was extremely vague on the goals and purposes of the organization.
Tie could not cite any specific political indoctrination. Clearly, we should not rely very heavily on these 12 interviews to establish the nature of the HMB --although 12 is not a trivial fraction of all reported HMB regulars. It may be significant that five of the 12
are not ethnic Pampangans; this is mildly inconsistent with the proposition that a Pampangan-speaking population is a necessary condition for HMB control in a properly specified model. The most important role of this interview data, however, is to confirm the reports that the HMB organization is torn by power struggles and to underscore the complex nature of the process by which the organization succeeds or fails.
Althoug'" operational variables are as important in determining the -29-pattern of control as variables relating to social unrest, it is still possible that members of the HMB themselves --particularly at lower levels --may be motivated in large part by idealistic visions of transforming society.
VII. POLICY TOWARD THE HMB
It is important not to apply the metaphor of Vietnam to the HMB.
The current Philippine insurgency bears little resemblance to the early Viet Cong. Actions based on an alleged similarity are likely to be unproductive. When we speak, for example, of 11MB "control" of a barrio it should be clear that the government has not been denied access to the barrio and that its social structure has not been rebuilt by the insurgents, as was the case in Vietnam. The 11MB themselves often live fairly ordinary lives at home with their families. This rebellion does not fit the models of a "classical" insurgency.
Although it may not be a "typical" insurgency, the HMB is still a nuisance for the Philippines government. The common view of politicians and the press is that the 1MB draws its power from popular discontent with social conditions --particularly land tenure arrangements --and dissatisfaction with the performance of the government. If this is true, the HMB may be a serious threat. Areas of tenancy extend beyond the current area of HMB operations providing, according to this view, promising areas for HMB expansion. By the same token, it would be difficult to reduce the level of 11MB control because it is hard for the government to accomplish significant changes in the social conditions allegvd to underlie HMB support among the people. Mitchell's model refer to the same names, they do not always refer to the same entities.
-33- 8 We were neyer able tp rediscover the source of Mitchell's list in the Constabulary. The data or. 1967 "control" that we obtained overlapped but did not match Mitchell's "control" for :he same year, and there were some obvious errors on Mitchell's list of controlled barrios.
Some of his listed barrios are really sitios --clusters of a score of huts rather than legal entities --and some of the barrios named could not be found on maps or official lists of political units.
9 Formally, the values of the other exogenous variables are multi--l plied by P before being transformed by (I -kA) or, in the linear case, before being used to fit the equation. This implies that control must be zero where P is zero. Using d:.ta for the 17 barrios that can be found both in our sample and
In the 1/2 percent sauiplei of the 1960 census, (a) appears to be true.
Condition (10 cannot be tested.
24AL the municipal level sugar was not zivnificant. Mitchell,
The Huk Rebellion, finds a positive relation between sugar and control.
2 5 Fitted without wc-ighting, these barrio models are substaniLively the same, although levels of significance are lower as we would expect. 
